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In	a	recent	article	Ulrich	Brand	has	discussed	how	best	to	perform	policy	analysis.	I	reflect	upon	the	paper	
as	an	interdisciplinary	researcher	experienced	in	public	policy	problems	and	their	analysis	with	a	particu-
lar	interest	in	the	relationship	between	social,	economic	and	environmental	problems.	At	the	centre	of	
the	paper	is	the	contrast	between	two	existing	methodologies	prevalent	in	political	science	and	related	
disciplines.	One	is	the	rationalist	approach,	which	takes	on	the	character	of	a	natural	science,	that	believes	
in	a	fully	knowable	objective	reality	which	can	be	observed	by	an	independent	investigator.	The	other	is	a	
strong	social	constructivist	position	called	interpretative	policy	analysis	(IPA),	where	knowledge	and	mean-
ing	become	so	intertwined	as	to	make	independence	of	the	observer	from	the	observed	impossible	and	
all	knowledge	highly	subjective.	Brand	then	offers	his	model	as	a	way	forward,	but	one	that	he	closely	
associates	with	the	latter.	My	contention	is	that	policy	analysis,	and	any	way	forward,	needs	to	provide	
more	of	a	transformative	combination	of	elements	from	both	approaches.	Indeed	I	believe	this	is	actu-
ally	what	Brand	is	doing.
Policy Analyse: Empirismus, gesellschaftliche Konstruktion und Realismus 
Schlüsselwörter:		Policy-Analyse,	interpretative	Policy-Analyse,	kritischer	Realismus,	historischer	Materia-
lismus,	kritische	Staatstheorie,	Wissen
Ulrich	Brand	hat	in	diesem	Journal	kürzlich	die	Frage	nach	neuen	Wegen	in	der	Policy-Analyse	aufgeworfen.	
Der	vorliegende	Kommentar	 ist	geschrieben	aus	Sicht	eines	 interdisziplinär	 forschenden	Politikwissen-
schaftlers	mit	 Interesse	an	den	Schnittstellen	 sozialer,	ökonomischer	und	ökologischer	Problemen.	 Im	
Mittelpunkt	stehen	zwei	unterschiedliche,	in	den	Sozialwissenschaften	vorherrschende	Methodologien.	
Der	rationalistische	Ansatz	ist	den	Naturwissenschaften	nachgebildet	und	nimmt	eine	vollständig	nachv-
ollziehbare,	objektive	Realität	an,	die	wissenschaftlich	beobachtet	werden	kann.	Die	sozialkonstruktivistische	
Position,	 oder	 interpretative	Policy	Analyse,	 nimmt	hingegen	Wissen	und	Meinung	 als	 untrennbar	
verknüpft	an,	weshalb	sich	wissenschaftliche	Beobachtung	davon	nicht	unabhängig	machen	kann	und	
daher	subjektiv	geprägt	bleibt.	Brand	bietet	sein	Modell	als	Ausweg	aus	dieser	Konstellation	an,	aber	er	
ordnet	es	vor	allem	der	sozialkonstruktivistischen	Position	zu.	Mein	Argument	lautet	dagegen,	dass	es	eine	
Synthese	von	Elementen	aus	beiden	Richtungen	braucht,	und	tatsächlich	ist	es	das,	was	Brand	selbst	macht.
Clive	L.	Spash	
Institute	for	Multi-Level	Governance	and	Development,	WU	Vienna	University	of	Economics	and	Business
E-Mail:	clive.spash@wu.ac.at
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In a recent article in this journal Ulrich Brand (2013) has discussed how best to perform policy 
analysis. The issues raised by Brand concern the role and meaning of the State, or the institutions 
of formal governance, in relation to policy formation within a modern capitalist economy. This 
involves drawing distinctions between politics, polity and policy in order to make the claim that 
some distinct aspects of policy have been neglected and/or misinterpreted by existing approach-
es to policy analysis. Brand particularly wants to promote a form of structural theory under the 
title of historical-materialist policy analysis (HMPA) as providing a better alternative to tradi-
tional analysis and post-structuralist approaches. I reflect upon the paper as an interdisciplinary 
researcher experienced in public policy problems and their analysis with a particular interest in 
the relationship between social, economic and environmental problems.
At the centre of the paper is the contrast between two existing methodologies prevalent in 
political science and related disciplines. In my understanding, the two positions can be charac-
terised as follows. One is the rationalist approach, which takes on the character of a natural 
science, that believes in a fully knowable objective reality which can be observed by an independ-
ent investigator. The other is a strong social constructivist position called interpretative policy 
analysis (IPA), where knowledge and meaning become so intertwined as to make independence 
of the observer from the observed impossible and all knowledge highly subjective. Brand then 
offers HMPA as a way forward, but one that he closely associates with IPA, which he regards as 
providing a good reference point. My contention is that policy analysis, and any way forward, 
needs to provide more of a combination employing and transforming elements from both the 
other approaches rather than a modified version purely building on interpretative analysis. Indeed, 
I believe this is actually what Brand himself is doing.
1. Rationalism and Naïve Objectivism
In the critical coverage of the rationalist approach the rather lose term of ‘positivist’ is used by 
Brand (429 and 438) as a general and negative attribution. This leaves open what specifically is 
objectionable about positivism, which has changed much since its foundation as a system of 
thought by Auguste Comte (1798–1857). The term has been associated with a variety of philo-
sophical approaches over the intervening 150 years. A more precise definition of the relevant 
problematic is therefore necessary and here I suggest the core concern might be summarised as 
naïve objectivism (Sayer 2010).
On this basis, rationalist policy analysis is recognised as making distinct assumptions about 
ontology and epistemology. Reality is regarded as being formed of identifiable objects that remain 
unchanged regardless of whom is doing the investigation of them, but more importantly that 
investigation is assumed to produce a self-evident truth. Truth here is meant as empirical facts 
speaking for themselves, so there is little or no controversy possible given the proviso of a sci-
entific quality investigation. The object of study (e.g., society or an aspect thereof) is meant to 
reveal itself in a singular and complete way through correctly conducted research (e.g., scien-
tific observation). Several objections can be raised against this position.
On the ontological front, non-observable factors and causes are easily overlooked in favour 
of facts that can be observed or easily investigated via available methods. Thus, for example, 
Brand raises the common absence from rationalist policy analysis of the role played by power 
structures (429). The lack of attention to metaphysical concepts compounds this problem by 
making the investigator believe they make no metaphysical claims when undertaking an inves-
	 	 Policy	analysis:	empiricism,	social	construction	and	realism	 403
tigation. In general, the naïve objectivist fails to understand the essential role played by concep-
tualisation in creating understanding. Thus they lack a broader perspective on their work, open-
ness to alternatives and the ability to think critically. Mainstream economics is a good example.
Naïve objectivism also tends to make claims for reality being stable, unchanging and context 
independent. This allows for easy generalisation and universal statements on the basis of limited 
observation. If A is observed occurring in correlation with B then a causal inference is assumed. 
The more often this relationship is observed the greater the confidence in the existence of the 
causal relationship. Event regularities, that can be measured statistically, then become a central 
matter for scientific investigation. As Brand notes, this results in policy analysis being reduced 
down to a largely context independent matter of compiling facts about who gets what, when and 
how (429).
On the epistemological front knowledge is equated to the empirical. What can be observed, 
or more generally sensed, is taken to be all that matters. Indeed reality is typically reduced down 
to what is measurable and even what has already been measured (e.g., secondary data). Experts 
are those who create knowledge and politics is absent from the interpretation and use of know-
ledge. The State acts in the public interest using best available scientific evidence. In policy terms, 
the overall picture is one that Dryzek (2005) has labelled administrative rationalism.
2. Interpretation and Strong Constructivism
While there are critical flaws in the naïve objectivism of the rationalist approach, the extent to 
which this means adopting a strong social constructivist alternative is far from clear. Indeed, 
when Brand introduces IPA as a better approach (429), several claims are made which I feel 
cannot be sustained. The implications of this for Brand’s own favoured alternative of HMPA then 
need to be clarified because, as I will explore, the stated close proximity with a strong social 
constructivist position, in contrast to the rationalist one, is misleading.
One aspect of my concern here is the extent to which knowledge creation can be regarded 
as totally subjective and relative, i.e. a matter of individual investigator and context. The claim 
in IPA is that ‘knowledge creates reality’, to paraphrase Brand (429), or, to quote him, that “mean-
ings and reality are produced” (430). I feel greater clarity about what is meant would help dis-
tinguish the role of interpretation from the factual basis of knowledge i.e., epistemological from 
ontological claims.
Clearly humans use their knowledge to impact the world around them. Human knowledge 
rearranges the world in both intended and unintended ways. For example, knowledge of the 
internal combustion engine may be regarded as promoting burning of fossil fuels on a vast scale, 
releasing gases that change the functioning of ecosystems and planetary climate. In this respect 
past knowledge can be seen as having the potential to change future reality. Knowledge of what 
is wrong today for humans and non-humans might also lead to a different future. Yet in important 
ways humans are working within the structure of a reality they do not produce.
What is certainly produced in the process of knowledge creation are concepts. The role of 
conceptualisation is a key aspect of investigation ignored by the naïve objectivist. However, that 
any investigation, research or analysis, requires concepts does not mean that concepts create 
reality. This is certainly misleading if taken to imply that reality is dependent upon or simply 
changes in accord with the concepts humans create. A straightforward counter to the generality 
of this position is provided by noting that biophysical objects of study remain unchanged by 
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conceptualisation. For example, that humans regarded the Earth as flat as opposed to round or 
the Earth as centre of the Universe as opposed to the Sun had no impact on these objects, i.e. the 
shape of the Earth or the solar system. If anything, reality creates knowledge because false con-
ceptualisations face reality, allowing the possibility of learning and progress as ideas are shown 
to fail (e.g., proving impractical, inadequate, bad explanations, poor predictors).
The contention might be that social sciences, such as policy analysis, are different because 
the social scientist studies an object of which they are a part. This can be typified as involving 
an extra layer of interpretation, or verstehen, a double hermeneutic (i.e., both of the object and 
the societal conceptualisation of that object). Here I think a distinction is necessary between a 
weak and strong constructivist position. As Steup (2010) explains: “constructivism, if weak, 
asserts the epistemological claim that scientific theories are laden with social, cultural, and his-
torical presuppositions and biases; if strong, it asserts the metaphysical claim that truth and real-
ity are themselves socially constructed.” Where Brand lies is left uncertain in his article, but I 
find the former is the only tenable position.
That “different groups conceive the world in different terms” (429) is far from being able 
to substantiate either that conceiving the world in a specific way changes reality to conform with 
the conception of it, or that worldviews can be held as valid regardless of reality. Policy analysis 
is the investigation of something that is in important ways external to the researcher and some-
thing about which they have good reason for concern because the problems involved are very 
real ones. That humans create knowledge does not mean in so doing they create reality, but 
rather they create their own understanding of reality, and this is an important distinction. Know-
ledge, and its role in society and between society and the State, then remains crucially dependent 
upon reality. This is why those who deny the holocaust must be understood as telling lies about 
reality and denying the truth. They do not merely construct something different, or have some 
different knowledge, or provide another interpretation. Why they choose to deny reality is a 
social science research question, but their existence leaves unchanged the real events to which 
their position is answerable.
Furthermore, the claim that the observer is inseparable from the observed seems highly 
exaggerated. Most social scientists, I would suggest, have little or no impact on their object of 
study. For example, a political scientist can study global climate change policy without any 
perceptible impact on that policy or anyone involved in the formation of that policy. In this respect 
there seems every prospect that research can be conducted in a manner that is substantively in-
dependent of the object being studied in much the same way as in the natural sciences.
If the epistemological position is accepted (i.e., weak constructivism) then the question is 
how the investigator as part of society can avoid bias in the knowledge they create. Here I agree 
with Sayer (2010, 25) that “[t]he intellectual’s interpretation of meaning is (or should be!) rigor-
ous and self-aware, thinking […] about beliefs and concepts as well as with them”. Part of the 
self-awareness is the realisation of the interconnection between facts and values. This does not 
mean that facts are replaced by values or that we can construct and associate events with what-
ever values we like and still claim to give an accurate or true account. It does require that social 
science be conducted in a way that is critical and honest about the representation of the objects 
it studies.
Another way in which IPA, as described by Brand, seems to overstretch itself is in the claims 
made about the role of uncertainty and change. In this respect, Brand refers to “the radical un-
certainty and complexity of the actual world” and goes on to state that “there is no fixed or sta-
bilized world” but rather “meanings are constantly changing” (429). What does this imply? First, 
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reference is being made to an actuality, or reality, and that means accepting that a reality external 
to ourselves exists and that is something upon which we can reflect. The importance of this lies 
in enabling beliefs or statements to be answerable to how things are, something outside them-
selves. Acceptance of this position means that we look to reality for confirmation of truth rather 
than, for example, justifying statements on the basis of their current usefulness or coherence with 
other statements (Spash 2012, 43). Second, that the “actual world” changes is an undeniable 
aspect of reality, but this does not equate to everything “constantly changing” in the sense that 
all knowledge becomes constantly invalid as things change. In contrast, some things are repeti-
tious and/or relatively stable while others are not, and that stability is the essence of how humans 
have created knowledge through trial and error, through practice. If the writings of Marx are still 
relevant today that is because some things remain unchanged, stable or fixed pretty firmly (if not 
permanently).
Yet, this should not be taken as rejecting the importance of potential instability and change. 
The prevalence of reductionist and mechanistic thinking, not least in economics, has proven 
highly problematic in this regard and encouraged downplaying radical uncertainty. Environmen-
tal policy is an area in which the contrast between what I term strong and weak uncertainty is 
stark (Spash 2002a). The former raises issues of unknown and unknowable outcomes, surprise 
events, unique occurrences, irreversibility and social indeterminacy. The latter is a narrow realm 
in which all outcomes are known and the probabilities of their occurrence can be known. In en-
vironmental policy, the strong uncertainty of a problem is often discussed and then rapidly dismissed 
and substituted by policy analysis based upon weak uncertainty. Thus, for example, the Interna-
tional Panel on Climate Change moved from scenario analysis to placing likelihoods on a limited 
set of future states to claims of probabilistic prediction of the occurrence of selected future states 
(Spash 2002b). In such instances subjective probabilities of ‘experts’ are employed to avoid the 
reality of strong uncertainty. Despite the work of Keynes (1988 [1921]) on the conceptualisation 
of strong uncertainty most economists persist in using an inappropriate weak uncertainty approach 
in all their policy applications and so claim impossible predictive capacities. In contrast, the po-
tential for surprise events and being aware of the fallibility of all knowledge should make humans 
more humble and encourage a precautionary approach in policy.
In ecological economics some have then responded by calling for public participatory ap-
proaches to knowledge creation and policy formation (e.g., post-normal science Funtowicz/
Ravetz 1994). Brand rightly warns of over optimism with respect to the possibilities and effects 
of participation (430). However, this remains a key aspect of the alternative to the rationalist 
agenda for policy formation and implementation, not least because of the concern that expertise 
and knowledge are powerful tools in the undemocratic reproduction of society (438). At the same 
time, any serious academic (let alone a Professor) is already engaged in the role and use of expert 
knowledge as a practice and cannot then deny its relevance for other ends, e.g. more democratic 
ones, emancipation, fighting oppression and so on. Once again a more nuanced understanding 
seems necessary and here one that includes expert and scientific knowledge as well as aspects 
of realism.
3. The Way Forward
Brand states that “[i]nterpretative policy analysis, and especially its Foucauldian version, is a 
good reference point for an HMPA” (430), but he clearly wants to go beyond this. His aim is to 
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develop a more sophisticated understanding of the State, policy and policy-making. He also sees 
HMPA as having the potential to more accurately elucidate the role of knowledge in the relation-
ship between the State and society. At certain points (432, 435, 437, 439), he clearly accepts a 
role for empiricism, and so the aspects of ‘positivism’ being rejected are not simply that a scien-
tific (rationalist) approach is totally flawed, nor that empirical investigation is unwarranted. 
Rather, I would suggest, the concern is how researchers (and policy analysts in particular) can 
make claims for empirical investigation that can actually be sustained and validated. What needs 
more thought is how such empiricism works alongside an understanding based upon weak con-
structivism and a realist structural position.
In Brand’s article I see much underlying realism. For example, HMPA is expected to “elu-
cidate more accurately” and be able to explain the structural conditions under which societal 
actors and forces “do in fact act” (430). This implies an object about which investigators can be 
accurate and that they have the ability to make factual claims. He calls for “concrete analyses 
against the background of theoretical assumptions and concepts” (431). This seems to diverge 
quite distinctly from the ideas, attributed to Foucault, that reality and meaning are produced.
However, in other statements Brand supports a (strong?) social constructivism leaving 
unclear his overall position. Brand states that, “IPA focuses on the important fact that the problems 
to be dealt with do not exist objectively, but are social constructions” (435). What should we take 
this to mean? The concern for rejecting objectivity here, I have suggested, is imprecise and should 
be specified as naïve objectivism not a rejection of the existence of reality or objects. What is 
being constructed is understanding of that reality and this requires concepts. How problems are 
understood is then partially related to the conceptualisation of their characteristics. At the same 
time not just any conceptualisation can be regarded as valid, because we still wish to relate to 
the real world. Indeed Brand uses his understanding of the real world to criticise others (e.g. the 
lack of attention to power, the misconceptualisation of the State) and suggests we progress our 
knowledge about the world through concrete analysis and empirical studies. So, while policy 
problems are certainly conceptualised and interpreted, policy analysis is not merely about using 
social constructs in the sense of having no knowledge of existence beyond what some social 
group (academic or other) fancies to imagine.
Indeed one aspect of the paper that worries me most is the lack of an explicit account of the 
realist element of policy analysis. This seems present but between the lines of Brand’s text. While 
the discussion of structural aspects of the social and political do have the flavour of realism the 
term is not associated with them. There are no mentions of reality or realism in the presentation 
of HPMA. However, there are twenty six mentions of “concrete” in various relationships (e.g., 
analysis, strategies, policy, policies, conflicts, forms of power). The term concrete then seems a 
code word for something being real, substantive and, yes, in many ways objective (but not na-
ïvely so).
Beyond this matter of explicit terminology, the emphasis on the social and political neglects 
biophysical reality. Policy formation, I would suggest, cannot be discussed purely in terms of 
societal relationships and power as if there were no biophysical world informing human know-
ledge and constraining human action. Why do we formulate environmental policies? Clearly 
there are real physical pollutants (toxic waste, radiation, hormone discharges, greenhouse gases, 
acidic deposition, chloroflurocarbons) and physical actions (cutting trees, building roads and 
houses, using cars and planes) that have real biophysical consequences (health impacts, species 
loss, ecosystem degradation, water, soil and air contamination, climate change, biodiversity loss). 
Regarding such problems as purely social constructs does them little justice and significantly 
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misrepresents them. If humanity were instantly removed from Earth today the biophysical con-
sequences of their past actions would persist (e.g. climate forcing would continue due to the stock 
of manmade greenhouse gases in the upper atmosphere and the operation of biophysical systems 
in the absence of humanity).
Brand seems to acknowledge something of this when he mentions the need to understand 
more than capitalist relations (e.g., capital accumulation or class domination) to understand 
environmental policy formation (431). He, if rather briefly, goes on to state that environmental 
problems have their own dynamic, such as the material degradation of living conditions and the 
role of modern science. However, I feel this caveat needs rather more attention and expansion. 
Human relationships with Nature and assumptions about reality seem highly relevant here. For 
example, the philosophy that ‘dilution is the solution to pollution’ might work for some pollutants 
in limited amounts but has proven disastrous given the type and scale of pollutants humans have 
developed. Policy based upon this engineering philosophy has been revealed as inappropriate 
given biophysical reality. The idea of biophysical reality being a constraint on and/or motivator 
for human action is absent from Brand’s discussion, although the bite of that constraint has been 
a primary concern of the environmental movement and a key policy driver.
In order to provide some focus for reflection (in this rather abstract discussion) some policy 
examples would also have helped. For example, consider how might a policy analyst best un-
derstand the creation of the Clean Air Acts in Britain and their consequences for international 
environmental policy? Coal burning for household heating and cooking was responsible for the 
infamous London smogs of the 1800s and 1900s. These ‘pea soup’ smogs were finally brought 
to an end after a related high number of hospital admissions and deaths were recorded by the 
newly founded National Health Service in the early 1950s. In particular, during the London smogs 
of 1952–1953, the death toll rose above 4,000, especially affecting the old and those with car-
diac and respiratory disorders (Holdgate 1980, 79). The Clean Air Acts of 1954 and 1962 re-
stricted the zones where coal could be burnt, while electricity produced by large coal-fired 
power stations was increasingly used for heating and cooking. Coal smogs were largely removed, 
but one result of the new power stations was to inject sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxides high 
into the atmosphere, where they were out of sight and out of mind. That was until the 1970s when 
Scandinavian scientists began to publicise the link between the changes in their forests and 
water ecosystems due to acidic deposition. A decade of dispute and scientific research led to the 
more general acceptance that the long-range transportation of air pollutants from the UK and 
Germany to Scandinavia was possible, but there was no action by the major emitters. Emissions 
were given more serious attention by the German government once their own forests began to 
die and environmentalists began to successfully move into mainstream politics. However, the 
main impact on emissions in the UK was due to the changing political and economic fortunes of 
the coal industry with successive Conservative administrations (under Maggie Thatcher) deter-
mined to break the power of the mining unions. The availability of cheaper natural gas and a 
move away from heavy industry aided this political agenda.
The point I wish to make with this example is that policy analysis requires understanding 
the interaction of social, economic and ecological factors. Capitalism, class and power relation-
ships help understand some aspects of the events. Thus, in the 1980s and 90s, political and 
structural change was affecting emissions rather than any concern for environmental damages 
inflicted on others. However, air pollution itself, its characteristics, its detection and scientific 
investigation are all important and key to the evolution and understanding of the policy develop-
ments. This involves both the collection of empirical data and its analysis using traditional expert 
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led scientific approaches to create knowledge. The use and abuse of expert knowledge and sup-
pression of research might well form part of the events, but this is because the reality of forest 
declines and dead people in London is a rather basic physical fact that confronts the existing 
societal understanding. Dead people, dead trees and collapsing ecosystems are real events not 
social constructs. Of course how society understands their implications is a matter of interpreta-
tion and this is where Brand’s HMPA might enable key insights. The different State reaction in 
Germany, UK and Scandinavia and their relative treatment of information can be empirically 
studied, along with their discursive and institutional governance structures, as Brand suggests 
should be done by policy analysts (426). The existence of different power groupings and vested 
interest are key mechanisms affecting policy reactions.
Yet this still leads me to doubt some of the statements Brand makes concerning policy 
formation. I do not believe that “whether or not certain issues become the object of policies is 
an open question” (434), or at least not so open as this suggests. Consider the case of fracking 
which reveals the neoliberal State allied with corporate interests (Bridge 2012), and the regu-
lated controlling the regulator in Galbraithian ways (Galbraith 2007 [1967]). Despite the at-
tempted control and suppression of information, fracking is a policy problem because of the real 
impacts it has on water systems. Institutions, power relationships and vested interest groups are 
all important mechanisms of policy formation, but so are biophysical consequences and human-
Nature relationships. This is not to deny the role of powerful players in the suppression and 
manipulation of information (something with which I am personally familiar, Spash 2014), but 
to argue that even the most powerful must face reality, and there are only limited valid alternative 
ways of interpreting events.
Another way to put my concern is to ask what level of environmental crises would motivate 
action. How many dead people? How many floods or droughts? How many deformed children 
living next to waste dump sites? How many collapsed ecosystems? What sort of society and 
political structure can maintain such a set of exploitative social and environmental relationships? 
Are we to suppose there are no biophysical consequences interacting with the social and politi-
cal structure?
Answering such questions would certainly seem to require looking at the role of information 
in society and power relationships, but also the ability of empirical investigation and scientific 
research to be performed in an open and critical way. Basic facts can prove hard to counter but 
may be suppressed as a result. Those who collect the data and produce the facts about the prob-
lem may be attacked and censored in order to discredit the information. Once facts, such as 4,000 
people died due to smogs, are accepted, policy action can still fail to occur. In some contexts 
those who suffer might be regarded as expendable, the legal system might allow harm of the 
innocent, or the society might be lacking in basic human rights. Those who benefit from the 
system, that is creating the harm, can be expected to defend it. There is certainly a concern that:
“the ecological crisis and its particular problems will not be framed under capitalist condi-
tions as policy problems in opposition to the general interests of capital, although they may 
be framed against, or in tension, with the interests of certain capital factions, depending on 
a variety of empirical factors”. (Brand 2013, 435)
This is often expressed as “jobs are more important than the environment”, and the administrative 
rationalism that “the benefits of environmental degradation outweigh the costs”. More subtly the 
Green Economy, tradable pollution permits and biodiversity offsets can be advocated to make 
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the necessary corrections to market failures using new market institutions. Yet what is being 
discussed here is how the problem is “framed” and understood, not its existence. The realisation 
of policy can then be recast as a complex of potential causal powers, including the biophysical, 
which can drive policy in different directions.
The discussion of a variety of potential causal powers, which may or may not be activated, 
would also clarify the empirical as only that which is realised. Brand’s “empirical factors” (435) 
should then be distinguished from potential causes which may either remain unrealised or fail to 
be empirically observed. Empiricism is important but limited as a way in which to understand 
reality. An alternative radical social ecological economy is a potential, but under capitalist con-
ditions prevented from arising. Empiricism can only reveal limited aspects of what has been 
actualised. There is the possibility that empirical research might show power relationships that 
prevent certain types of information from leading to policy action, but much remains hidden from 
the empirical perspective.
A critical realist perspective can, I believe, help clarify the relationships between the real, 
the actual and the empirical. The naïve objectivist typically reduces reality to atomistic events 
and regularities between them basing their knowledge claims only on what is observable. This 
means what is observed is taken to be what exists and reality is equated to the empirical. Yet, 
empirical observation is limited and only forms a subset of actual events (i.e., to simplify, not 
everything that happens is measured or measurable). Similarly, the actualised is a subset of the 
potential (i.e., what could have happened if …). This recognises that the reduction of reality to 
activated and/or realized mechanisms neglects unactivated and/or unrealized mechanisms that 
exist as potentials (e.g. potential policies that go unformulated and unrealised). There is then a 
distinction between real structures and actual events as well as between actual events and em-
pirical experience.
Humans may well maintain exploitative relationships with Nature that empirically appear 
unproblematic for a long time, just as capitalism exploits labour and still thrives. This was a 
central argument made in the 1970s explanation of how exponential growth patterns in human 
society could lead to collapse without being recognised by traditional scientific empiricism 
(Meadows et al. 1972). The structure of our material and energy throughput economy is incom-
patible with maintaining the structure and functioning of ecological systems, but empiricism is 
backward looking and will reveal the full scale of the disaster only after the event, when action 
is too late.
4. Concluding Remarks
Ulrich Brand has proposed that neither the rationalist nor the interpretative approaches to policy 
analysis are adequate. They both fail to address important aspects of reality and propose meth-
odological procedures that exclude each other’s insights. While IPA has made some valid criti-
cisms of the rationalist approach the position also has its own problems. The strong constructiv-
ist perspective as a reaction to the naïve objectivist can be regarded as having heavily overplayed 
its hand in terms of the extent to which scientific investigation is to be rejected and all knowledge 
is to be regarded as contextual and relative. Indeed, despite Brand claiming close proximity, there 
seem to be some stark differences between his HMPA and the neo-Foucauldian IPA.
While Brand allies himself explicitly as closer to the interpretative approach he makes 
proposals which, to me, seem closer to an alternative that embraces but aims to transform certain 
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elements of the previous approaches. In this respect some of the claims about social construction 
of knowledge appear to contradict others about the role of structure and empirical analysis. 
Perhaps the use of examples to explicate the proposed framework for policy analysis might help. 
There certainly is a need for recognition that policy analysis does require concepts that need to 
be constructed but also does relate to a social, economic and ecological reality. This requires 
steering a course between naïve objectivism and strong social constructivism. In the process, an 
explicit account is required of the role and form of empirical analysis and what it can and cannot 
be expected to deliver. In doing so, analysis of the hidden real structures and potentials of the 
world need to be placed at the fore.
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